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Abstract—The modernisation that stems from Industry 4.0
started populating the manufacturing sector with networked
devices, complex sensors, and a significant proportion of physical
actuation components. However, new capabilities in networked
cyber-physical systems demand more complex infrastructure and
algorithms and often lead to new security flaws and operational
risks that increase the attack surface area exponentially. The
interconnected nature of Industry 4.0-driven operations and the
pace of digital transformation mean that cyber-attacks can have
far more extensive effects than ever before. Based on that, the
core ideas of this paper are driven by the observation that cyber
security is one of the key enablers of Industry 4.0. Having this
in mind, we propose CryptoFactory – a forward looking design
of a layered-based architecture that can be used as a starting
point for building secure and privacy-preserving smart factories.
CryptoFactory aims to change the security outlook in smart
manufacturing by discussing a set of fundamental requirements
and functionality that modern factories should support in order
to be resistant to both internal and external attacks. To this end,
CryptoFactory first focuses on how to build trust relationships
between the hardware devices in the factory. Then, we look on
how to use several cryptographic approaches to allow IoT devices
to securely collect, store and share their data while we also
touch upon the emerging topic of secure and privacy-preserving
communication and collaboration between manufacturing envi-
ronments and value chains. Finally, we look into the problem of
how to perform privacy-preserving analytics by leveraging Trusted
Execution Environments and the promising concept of Functional
Encryption.
Index Terms—Security, Privacy, Industry 4.0, Smart Factories
I. INTRODUCTION
Industry is the backbone of the European Union’s economy.
It accounts for 80% of Europe’s exports and private innovations
and provides high-skilled jobs for citizens. Furthermore, about
17% of total value added in the EU comes from manufacturing.
One job in manufacturing creates up to two and a half other
jobs across the value-chain.
Even though the manufacturing sector traditionally used
automated machines to increase productivity, adoption of other
cutting-edge technologies was rather limited. However, the sec-
tor has undergone a tumultuous decade that radically changed
the way it operates. Nowadays, the manufacturing industry
aims to improve competitiveness and productivity, as well as to
support collaboration between stakeholders by adopting a col-
lection of cutting-edge technologies such as cloud computing,
the Internet of Things and Machine Learning. Adoption of ICT
technologies and their convergence with the existing manufac-
turing technologies enables effective and accurate engineering
decision-making in real-time.
Advances in both manufacturing, computing and network
communication paved the way for the adoption of Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS), where data is closely monitored and
synchronized between the physical factory floor and the cyber
computational space. Moreover, by utilizing advanced informa-
tion analytics, networked machines are able to operate in a more
efficient, collaborative and resilient way. There is no doubt that
the use of such technologies is transforming the manufacturing
industry to the next generation. However, besides bringing more
opportunities this transformation introduces several challenges.
Hence, there is an urgent need to create mechanisms ensuring
that the adoption of these new technologies will be done in a
reliable, secure and efficient way.
The modernization that stems from Industry 4.0 started
populating the manufacturing sector with several networked
devices, complex sensors, and a significant proportion of phys-
ical actuation components. Until now, the main focus of this
transformation was on integrating networked and smart devices
into existing manufacturing environments to improve produc-
tivity, efficiency and reduce direct human effort and resources.
However, new capabilities in networked cyber-physical systems
demand more complex infrastructure and algorithms and often
lead to new security flaws and operational risks that increase
the attack surface area exponentially. The interconnected nature
of Industry 4.0–driven operations and the pace of digital
transformation create preconditions for cyber-attacks that are
more extensive, destructive and costly than ever before. Without
focused, decisive and energetic actions to improve security,
manufacturers and their supply networks remain unprepared in
the face of the risks. As a result, Cybersecurity is one of the
key enablers of Industry 4.0.
According to EEF’s1 2018 Cybersecurity for Manufacturing
report [1], 48% of manufacturers have suffered cyber-attacks,
with half of those victims sustaining financial or other business
losses. NTTSecurity’s 2018 Global Threat Intelligence Center
report [2] identified manufacturing as the fourth-most targeted
industry, behind only finance, technology, and business and
professional services. Along with the transformation of the
manufacturing sector the cybersecurity landscape is also under-
1EEF was formed in 1896 as the Engineering Employers’ Federation and
merged in 1918 with the National Employers’ Federation.
going a metamorphosis of unprecedented scale. As a result, to
adequately address cybersecurity risks in the age of Industry
4.0, cybersecurity strategies should be secure, vigilant, and
resilient. They must be fully integrated into organizational and
information technology strategies from the beginning of the
strategic process. Cybersecurity must become an integral part
of the strategy, design, and operations, considered from the
beginning of any new connected, Industry 4.0-driven initiative.
Technologies for Industry 4.0 will further intensify the need
to upgrade measures for internal security. The challenges to
security are becoming bigger than ever, with both attackers
and cybersecurity professionals vying to remain ahead. In
today’s hyper connected world, cyber-attacks are no longer a
matter of “if”, but rather “when”. Industry 4.0 is becoming
a reality – with all its promises and vulnerabilities. However,
protecting such complicated environments is not a straightfor-
ward approach and requires designing out-of-the-box security
mechanisms that will in many cases deviate from the classic
security approaches.
A. Our Contribution
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we present
a list of core security requirements that must be considered
when building smart factories. These security requirements
were derived based on our experience from conducting applied
research in the fields of cloud security, IoT security, privacy
and cryptography – areas that will form the foundations of
future factories. Second, we present a forward looking design
of a layered-based architecture that can be used as a starting
point for building smart factories that will be resistant to a wide
range of cyber attacks. Furthermore, the presented architecture
is a modular one – meaning that extra components and services
can be easily added. Hence, allowing several organizations to
adopt a similar approach without having to sacrifice their basic
functionality. Finally, we hope that this work will help protocol
designers to build novel security protocols that can squarely fit
the specific needs of Industry 4.0 while at the same time pave
the way for secure and privacy-preserving smart factories.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents a high level overview of the basic technologies that
will constitute the core of CryptoFactory architecture. Sec-
tion III presents the proposed modular architecture as well as
with the main functionality of the underlying components.
II. CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES AND RESEARCH
CHALLENGES
The complexity of technology underlying cloud computing
and the Internet of Things introduces novel security risks and
challenges [3]. While threats and mitigation techniques for the
two fields have been under intensive scrutiny in recent years,
there is only a little work that has been done in the direction
of modern infrastructures protecting facilities that are based
on the use of both paradigms. In this section, we present the
basic concepts of the main technologies that will be used in
our architecture.
A. Trustworthy Execution and Software Defined Networks for
Manufacturing Environments
Creating trustworthy and verifiable infrastructures and ser-
vices is of paramount importance. To do so, the most common
way is to use special secure hardware that allows authorized
users to verify the integrity of an entity (e.g. cloud host,
IoT device, etc.). This verification process is a cryptographic
protocol known as attestation and exposes an aggregated pool
of isolated execution capabilities, based on hardware secu-
rity features (both bare-metal and virtualized), available on
commodity cloud platforms. Such hardware security features
include: Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), isolated execution
enclaves based on Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [4],
or memory and execution isolated based on AMD Secure
Memory Encryption, AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualisation
(SEV) [5], or ARM TrustZone [6]. The availability of the
features depends on the platform vendor (Intel and AMD are
the most common vendors of cloud server platforms) or on the
platform hardware configuration (especially relevant for TPMs,
but also applicable for SGX and SEV features). An attestation
protocol involves a target, an attester, an appraiser, and possibly
other principals serving as trust proxies. The purpose of an
attestation protocol is to supply evidence that will be considered
authoritative by the appraiser, while respecting the privacy goals
of the target (or its owner). Digitalization has a profound impact
on the proliferation of computing devices in the manufacturing
context. Along with improvements to manufacturing efficiency,
this change also brings a set of security challenges, as more and
more devices used in the manufacturing context are connected
to local or public networks, are used outside of the manufac-
turing facilities, or are exposed as a service to users.
Apart from using secure hardware to verify the integrity and
therefore the trusted state of an entity, this hardware can be
also used to create an isolated execution environment (also
known as a TEE). This is a technique that can significantly
increase the overall security of a service since certain, usually
sensitive, parts of the service will be running in a secure and
isolated space where no interaction with external sources will
be available. Hence, even if parts of the host or the service
itself have been compromised, functions that deal with sensitive
information and running in a TEE will not be affected. An
isolated execution environment can be created in several ways.
One approach to construct an isolated execution environment
is by validating the platform’s trusted computing base (TCB)
using secure boot, as the TCB is by definition isolated from
the rest of the system. However, this approach is progressively
less suitable beyond a very compact TCB, such as a hypervisor
that can be formally verified. A different approach is required
when confidential information – such as cryptographic keys – is
persistently maintained on the platform. To address this, some
platform manufacturers have introduced support for firmware-
supported Trusted Execution Environments. TEEs often include
storage for a (statistically) unique device key and an execution
environment in which small pieces of code can be executed
in isolation from the rest of the system. Combined with the
secure boot or trusted boot procedures, TEEs can become a
minimal TCB for platform software. The TCB can in turn be
leveraged by the booted operating system (OS), as well as
by software installed on the device or by external appraisers
that aim to assess the platform’s trustworthiness. A TEE
is a secure, integrity-protected processing environment, with
processing, memory and storage capabilities, isolated from an
untrusted, Rich Execution Environment that comprises the OS
and installed applications.
While the problem of integrity verification for machines
occupied with specific secure hardware is a well-studied prob-
lem [7], [8], getting certain guarantees about the trusted state
of a constrained device (i.e. a device that is not occupied with
secure hardware) is still considered as an open and difficult
to solve problem. However, due to the complex networked
computing systems that electronically control modern factories
(a combination of powerful machines with edge, constrained,
devices) building a software-based protocol is considered as a
necessary step to build trusted smart factories. By doing this,
authorized stakeholders will be able to verify the integrity of
devices without the need to install any special hardware.
B. Secure Cloud Storage and Operations on Encrypted Data
Cloud storage has rapidly become a cornerstone of many
businesses and has moved from an early adopters stage to
an early majority, where we typically see explosive deploy-
ments. Cloud technologies and in particular cloud storage plays
a crucial role in the development of Industry 4.0 services.
However, while joining the cloud revolution it has become
necessary, the field of manufacturing is still slow in adopting
such technologies due to several security issues that a remote
storage implies. However, lately, we have seen some great
developments in the field of cryptography that squarely fit
the cloud paradigm and can give smart factories the necessary
guarantees about the security of their data. For many emerging
applications such as “cloud” services, where third parties can
have access to your data, the traditional notion of encryption
is insufficient. For example, there is often a need to specify a
decryption policy in the ciphertext and only individuals who
satisfy the policy can decrypt [9], or it is important to store
data in an encrypted form and being able to search directly
over the encrypted data or even being able to execute certain
computations/functions on ciphertexts. During the last years
we have seen some really interesting developments in the field
of applied cryptography. Developments that move away from
the traditional notion of cryptography and have the potential
to change the way we use and trust cloud-based services.
All of the above mentioned examples can be solved with
techniques like Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [10], Sym-
metric Searchable Encryption (SSE) [11], [12] and Functional
Encryption (FE) [9], [13].
ABE was first introduced by Sahai and Waters [14] to solve
the problem of encrypted access control. In ABE, every secret
key is generated along with a policy P while ciphertexts are
generated with a set of attributes U . Decryption is possible if
the list of attributes satisfies the underlying policy (i.e. P (U) =
True).
SSE allows users to outsource encrypted data to a possibly
untrusted remote location while simultaneously being able to
perform keyword search directly through the stored ciphertexts.
An ideal SSE scheme should reveal no information about the
content of the encrypted information nor about the searched
keywords and their mapping to the stored files. In [15] the
authors presented a forward-looking design of a cryptographic
cloud storage built on an untrusted IaaS infrastructure. The
approach aims to provide confidentiality and integrity, while
retaining the benefits of cloud storage – availability, reliability,
efficient retrieval and data sharing – and ensuring security
through cryptographic guarantees rather than administrative
controls. The solution requires four client-side components:
data processor, data verifier, credential generator, token gener-
ator.
FE is another promising technique that is a perfect candidate
for solving the the problem of privacy-preserving collection of
data for analytics.
FE is a cryptographic primitive that allows a user with a
secret key to learn a function evaluated on some encrypted data.
A trusted authority holding a master secret key can generate
special functional secret keys, where each functional key is
associated with a function f (or program) on plaintext data.
When the functional key is used to decrypt a ciphertext, which
is the encryption of some message m, the result is the quantity
f(m) – nothing else about m is revealed. Thus, FE is a
powerful cryptographic tool that allows users to do certain
computations on encrypted data without revealing anything
about the actual content of the data. Hence, users’ privacy can
be protected from both internal and external attacks.
For many emerging applications such as “cloud” services the
traditional notion of public-key encryption is
III. CRYPTOFACTORY: A FORWARD LOOKING DESIGN FOR
SECURE AND TRUSTED SMART FACTORIES
Securing communication between the manufacturing stake-
holders (e.g. between IoT devices and the CSP) is undoubtedly
an important first step towards building a secure modern
factory. However, this can be only seen as the basic step
that a modern factory should follow on its way to secure
its underlying important assets. Having this in mind, modern
factories must further extend the security related functionality
by offering several additional core features that are currently
missing in existing frameworks. To this end, every smart factory
will have to address the problem of hardware trustworthiness
for both the cloud platform and the IoT devices with main
aim to ensure, prior to use, that all the underlying devices,
systems and services run in a trusted state. Moreover, another
important CryptoFactory focus area is performing privacy-
preserving analytics over factory data, since this will allow
factories to determine performance improvements and support
more accurate decision-making processes. Apart from that,
project CryptoFactory will work on implementing another layer
of protection through the use of machine learning algorithms.
A concrete set of anomaly and threat detection algorithms will
be implemented, capable to analyse data in real-time as well as
offline and detect possible threats/malicious behaviours. Finally,
CryptoFactory will promote the collaboration between multiple
manufacturing environments and value chains. Attribute-Based
Encryption security protocols will be designed to securely share
encrypted data among manufacturing stakeholders and along
their value chains.
In this section we will describe a forward looking design
of an open, modular and extensible architecture, based on
individual, autonomous, reusable and self-contained building
blocks. The CryptoFactory architecture consists of six discrete
layers, illustrated in Figure 1: The Edge Multicloud layer,
the Secure Execution layer, the Crypto Layer, the Anomaly
Detection layer and the Data Analytics layer.
A. Edge Multicloud layer
The base of CryptoFactory architecture will utilize cloud
resources and also incorporate a wide range of IoT edge devices
with main aim to collect and process data. This, will form
CryptoFactory’s Edge Multicloud Platform (CEMP). CEMP
should be built on existing mature components in order to speed
up the design and development process. However, extension
and further development of these components will still be re-
quired to achieve the desired level of integration and to support
the largely distributed environment. CEMP should incorporate
various cloud resources for the central processing of data in
scenarios where significant computational power is required
(e.g. computation intensive data analytics applications). These
cloud resources can represent both public and private clouds.
To achieve seamless migration and execution of applications
on this heterogeneous cloud testbed, a multicloud platform
should be considered. Apart from the central cloud resources,
CEMP should incorporate various IoT edge devices typical
in manufacturing environments. To execute applications in
this heterogeneous edge multicloud environment, appropriate
mechanisms for the distribution of tasks and data between the
edge devices and the central cloud resources should be carefully
developed. Such distribution and orchestration mechanisms will
target problems such as which computation to execute locally
on the edge device, when to transfer data and computation to
the cloud, and how to distribute workload among edge devices.
B. Secure Execution layer
The aim of this layer will be to support the implementation
of pluggable applications to enhance the security functionality
of the CryptoFactory architecture. In CryptoFactory, the IaaS
(Infrastructure-as-a-Service) compute hosts offered by the Edge
Multicloud Layer will be equipped with trusted computing
hardware and firmware security features that support the cre-
ation of trusted and isolated execution environments. Some of
the trusted computing devices (such as TPM v1.2, see Section
1.4.4) have been available even prior to the emergence of
cloud computing. However, they are ill-adapted to the cloud
computing context and were not widely used. A new generation
of hardware and firmware security features (TPM 2.0, Intel
SGX, Arm TrustZone) recently became available on cloud
server platforms. Unfortunately, cloud service providers provide
at best only very limited access to such security enablers in their
commercial offerings.
This layer should apply the advances in trusted comput-
ing to enable cloud users to assess platform and software
trustworthiness, as well as to deploy software in isolated
execution environments. This, will ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the loaded code and data. To do so, hardware
and firmware security features will be leveraged to develop
applications for isolated execution environments supporting
core functionality of a factory. In particular, such secure isolated
execution environments will host support functions for attesting
the integrity of edge devices as well as of the launched VMs in
the underlying cloud environment. An overview of the integrity
verification mechanisms of this layer is illustrated in Figure 1.
Furthermore, CryptoFactory will leverage isolated execution
environments to host components executing privacy-preserving
analytics on encrypted data (see Subsection III-E).
C. Crypto Layer
The crypto layer will be implemented as a collection of cryp-
tographic algorithms and will be one of the key components for
both the security and the main functionality of CryptoFactory.
This layer will provide a complete cryptography toolkit used
to protect stored data and secure the communication between
connected components and entities in the system. Furthermore,
it will support the secure execution layer to assess the trust-
worthiness of the underlying cloud platform and of the edge
devices collecting and transmitting factory data. The Crypto
Layer will be fully integrated with the CEMP and will secure
communication on top of that platform.
Due to the special nature of smart factories (complex net-
working ecosystem), this layer should not rely only on the
implementation of traditional cryptographic algorithms. More
precisely, the novelty of this layer will be the implementation
of modern encryption techniques that will allow factories not
only to secure data in rest and on transit but also to perform
operations on encrypted data. To this end, in the core of the
Crypto Layer an implementation of an Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion (ABE) scheme and a Functional Encryption (FE) scheme
should be considered. ABE will be used to allow data exchange
and collaboration between the manufacturing facilities and the
value chains while offering an efficient revocation mechanism2.
By utilizing ABE, factories will be able to encrypt data by using
a public ABE key and a policy that will define who is able to
access and decrypt data. Therefore, the same ciphertext can
be shared with multiple manufacturing stakeholders but only
the ones that have been defined in the policy will be able to
recover the plaintext. This functionality has a great potential
since one single ciphertext will be possibly decrypted by more
than one different keys. Furthermore, the access revocation
of a manufacturing stakeholder will be a simplified since the
owner of the underlying data will be able to revoke only the
unique key of the underlying stakeholder and therefore avoiding
complex revocation methods that would require the decryption
and re-encryption of data with a fresh key.
Furthermore, the FE scheme will be partially operating in an
isolated environment supported by the secure execution layer
and will be used only by authorized stakeholders. The function-
ality offered by the supported Functional Encryption will allow
authorized stakeholders to perform statistical operations based
on encrypted data without decrypting them – hence, learning
nothing about the actual content of the data. Thus, FE will
pve the way for the design and implementation of privacy-
preserving analytics protocols.
2Currently, revocation in ABE is a complex problem that has significant
effect to the overall efficiency of the scheme. However, there are other
promising revocation mechanisms, such as [16], that leverage the power of
TEEs and offer a revocation mechanism that is separated from the actual ABE
scheme.
Fig. 1. Secure Execution Layer
D. Anomaly Detection layer
Anomaly detection is an important aspect of smart manufac-
turing. If the operation of a machine or an asset deviates from
the set standards, it may affect the overall operations. To this
end, mechanisms that will be dedicated to detect outliers, faults
or anomalies before these actually occur should be in place in
every modern factory. Such mechanisms need to deliver real-
time anomaly detection paired with a deep analysis framework
over streamed data. This will be used to perform machine
and deep learning analysis tasks, at scale, in order to extract
complex behavioural patterns and insights to timely identify
evolving threats. Furthermore, additional analytic techniques
and mechanisms should be implemented and customized to
allow the extraction of threat indicators, including anomaly
detection, robust self-learning models for advanced security in
support of early warning intelligence, sophisticated reporting
and cascading effects calculation, etc. Moreover, alerts for
early anomaly detection, indications and recommendations will
should be coupled with a rule-based machine learning approach
to enact targeted mitigation measures by utilising the set
of relational rules that collectively represent the knowledge
captured by the traffic flows. The development and integration
of such a framework in a modern factory will eventually allow
to protect all phases of the manufacturing process.
E. Data Analytics layer
One of the core functionalities of CryptoFactory will be
to allow authorized manufacturing stakeholders to perform
analytics based on factory data. This will be done through a
series of statistical functions provided by the Data Analytics
Layer. The use of this layer will be to correlate and analyse
data made available by the CryptoFactory platform to generate
new insights and knowledge. This layer will offer a wide range
of typical statistical operations needed for manufacturing data
analytics. Apart from typical statistical functions and simple
visualisation, this layer will be capable of performing privacy-
preserving analytics. More precisely, the main novelty of this
layer reflects the use of Functional Encryption in an isolated
environment. CryptoFactory will be using this promising en-
cryption technique to run statistical computation directly on
encrypted data. Hence, private information contained in the
individual data will be fully protected. Furthermore, this will
also play a crucial role in cross-border collaboration where
statistical data will be shared among multiple partners. Finally,
as part of the Data Analytics Layer, CyrptoFactory will also
support a mechanism to enable collecting and sharing sta-
tistical measurements about the performance of different IoT
devices used in the manufacturing context. This information
will be later shared in a privacy-preserving way with other
manufacturing actors through a central service responsible
for collecting and classifying statistical measurements from
multiple manufacturing data sources. This privacy-preserving
reputation system will allow other manufacturing actors to
make more accurate decisions regarding the equipment they
need to efficiently complete a task – hence increasing produc-
tivity. We believe that this privacy-preserving reputation system
has the potential to enable a self-comparison ability, where
the performance of a single machine can be compared with
and rated among the fleet and, on the other hand, similarities
between machine performance and previous assets (historical
information) can be measured to predict the future behaviour
of the machinery. An overview of the Data analytics and Threat
Detection Layers is illustrated in Figure 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a forward looking design of a
modular architecture that can fit the emerging field of smart
factories. To this end, we studied several novel and promising
technologies such as trusted/secure hardware, attribute-based
encryption, symmetric searchable encryption, functional en-
cryption and the application of machine learning for anomaly
detection and showed how they can be proved important during
the capitalization of Industry 4.0. Finally, we hope that this
work will be an important reference point for protecting smart
factories and other similarly complicated environments.
Fig. 2. Data Analytics and Threat Detection Layers
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